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FLSA RESTRICTIONS ON VOLUNTEERISM: THE
INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL COSTS IN A
CHANGING ECONOMY
INTRODUCTION
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 19381 governs the em-
ployment of persons engaged, either individually or through an en-
terprise, in interstate commerce.2 An individual defined as an
"employee" within the meaning of the Act must be compensated
according to the Act's mandatory minimum wage provisions, de-
spite the individual's wish to volunteer and forego compensation. 3
Department of Labor (DOL) publications and federal court cases
discussing employment relationships covered by the FLSA drasti-
cally limit acceptable volunteer activities.4 Examples of permissible
volunteer activities include those involving students enrolled in in-
ternship programs, trainees, and bona fide administrators and exec-
utives. 5 Other individuals, such as office workers, who volunteer in
a productive capacity at either a nonprofit or a for-profit corpora-
tion, fall beyond the scope of the Act's exemptions.6
At the root of this limitation on permissible volunteer activities
is the fear that employers will wield superior bargaining power to
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
2 WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT RELATION-
SHIPS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT (WH Pub. 1297, 1985) [hereinafter EM-
PLOYMENT RELATIONS SUPPLEMENT]. The FLSA's coverage extends to both public and
private sector employees. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985) (holding that the Constitution does not bar the application of the FLSA to state
and local governments). For a discussion of Garcia, see Terence G. Connor & Ronald
Witkowski, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: Public Employers Meet
the FLSA, FLA. B. J., July-Aug. 1985, at 33; see also James S. Maloney & Victoria M. Bun-
sen, The Fair Labor Standards Act: Criminal and Civil Liability, 14 COLO. LAw. 1802, 1802
(1985) (discussing criminal and civil liability resulting from employer non-compliance
with FLSA standards); Linda S. Vanden Heuvel, Public Employers Subject to Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, WIs. B. BULL., Oct. 1985, at 17 (discussing the ramifications of the FLSA ex-
tension to government workers).
3 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219; see also Vadino v. A. Valey Eng'rs, 903 F.2d 253, 265
(3rd Cir. 1990) (holding that an employer and employee cannot abridge FLSA minimum
wage and overtime provisions by contract and that statutory rights prevail over any col-
lective bargaining agreement); Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp., 523 F.2d 1153, 1158 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (FLSA principles apply despite contrary custom or agreement).
4 See infra notes 84-113, 130-83 and accompanying text.
5 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 1.
6 Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); see infra
notes 152-67 and accompanying text. The term "productive work" is used throughout
this Note to describe any work performed by an individual who generates productive
output for an organization.
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coerce prospective employees into working for substandard or no
compensation.7 Attempts to limit employer coercion, however,
have barred many individuals from performing volunteer services in
which coercion plays no role. As a result, these individuals must
often forego valuable training experiences. 8 The adverse effects of
limitations on volunteer activities are not exclusive to individuals;
nonprofit organizations also suffer under the current state of the
law. While such organizations desperately need volunteers to main-
tain their labor-intensive services without incurring substantial addi-
tional costs, the DOL will not permit them to employ volunteers to
perform work that falls outside the FLSA's narrow category of per-
missible volunteer activities. 9 An examination of the Act and the
congressional intent behind its passage, however, strongly suggests
that Congress did not intend the FLSA to prevent such volunteer
services.
Congress enacted the FLSA as an anti-poverty device designed
to ameliorate the economic and social conditions running rampant
in the wake of the Great Depression. 10 While the social conditions
that gave rise to its original passage have since changed, the Act
currently remains largely unaltered." Both the federal courts and
the DOL have extended the FLSA far beyond its intended reach. In
so doing they have prohibited many volunteer activities in violation
of both the legislative intent and the social policy that gave rise to
the Act.12 This Note argues that Congress should amend the FLSA
to allow individuals to perform volunteer services that are currently
prohibited but yet are consistent with the Act's original purpose.
The FLSA currently allows an individual, acting as a trainee, to
volunteer her services as long as she meets six criteria. The DOL
believes that by imposing this test it can adequately guard against
employer coercion. This Note argues that through a slight modifi-
cation of the FLSA's trainee test the DOL can also insure that an
individual who volunteers her services in a currently prohibited ca-
pacity is similarly shielded from employer coercion.
Part I of this Note assesses our nation's need for volunteers.
Part II examines the pre-FLSA background and the legislative intent
behind the Act's passage, and discusses the Act's enforcement pro-
cedures, definitions, and exceptions. Part III considers the federal
courts' interpretations of the FLSA. Part IV presents three hy-
7 See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 27-48 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 13-26 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
1 See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 130-73 and accompanying text.
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potheticals that illustrate problems arising under the courts' and the
DOL's current views of the Act. Finally, Part V proposes a test
designed to guard against employer coercion without banning all
nonexempt volunteers from engaging in productive activity.
I
THE NEED FOR VOLUNTEERS
A. The Need for Volunteers at Nonprofit Institutions
Our nation's ability to provide greatly needed social services is
undercut by a scarcity of available resources.13 Nonprofit organiza-
tions, historically the major source of such social services, rely heav-
ily on government funding as their principal source of income.14
Federal budget cuts, however, have placed tremendous pressure on
charitable organizations struggling to maintain adequate social serv-
ices. 15 From 1982 to 1988, direct federal support to non-profit or-
ganizations decreased by $26.7 billion, or 23%.16 To compensate
for these cuts in federal spending, many nonprofit organizations re-
luctantly have begun charging fees for their services.17
Facing acute funding shortages, nonprofit organizations must
seek less expensive ways to maintain their labor-intensive services. 18
At the same time, these institutions must also raise salaries to com-
petitive levels in order to attract competent employees.1 9 This com-
petition with the for-profit sector creates a tremendous incentive for
nonprofit organizations to attract volunteers to perform productive
work. 20 While nonprofit organizations need such noncompensatory
services, most have experienced a dearth in volunteer labor.21
13 Carol L. Couch, Volunteer Service in the Nonprofit Sector: Meeting the Challenge, 11 J.
LEGIs. 441, 441 (1984). A depressed economy magnifies this problem because former
contributors often become the recipients of social service provided by nonprofit organi-
zations. See David Haldane, United Way Dips Into Reserves To Aid 36 Agencies, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1992, at BI (noting that the economy has created a "charity drought").
14 State of the Nonprofit Sector, 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer
Protection, & Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1989) (statement of Lester M. Salamon, Director of theJohn Hopkins Institute
for Policy Studies) [hereinafter Nonprofit Sector].
15 Id. at 34.
16 Id. Funding for some social service organizations has fallen 30% or more since
1980. Id.
17 Id. at 53. "In other words, under the pressure of the government cuts, nonprofit
organizations [have been] finding it necessary to become more commercial in their oper-
ations in order to survive." Id.
18 Couch, supra note 13, at 411-12. See generally VIRGINIA A. HODGgINsoN ET AL.,
THE FUTURE OF THE NONPROFrr SEcTOR (1989) (identifying, reviewing, and defining ma-
jor problems and current trends facing the nonprofit sector).
19 Couch, supra note 13, at 441-42.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 443. Although an estimated thirty-eight million Americans perform vari-
ous volunteer services, the supply of volunteer labor remains far from adequate. See
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In an effort to maintain services without substantially increasing
costs, nonprofit organizations such as the United Way and the
American Red Cross have, in the last decade, redoubled their efforts
to attract volunteers. 22 The Reagan Administration assisted such in-
stitutions by appealing to civic consciousness and altruism, and even
proclaimed May 1, 1983 through April 30, 1984, "the National Year
of Voluntarism. '' 23 President Reagan also appointed a task force
calling for government to remove impediments and create incen-
tives for increased volunteerism. 24 President Bush, a "staunch be-
liever in the redemptive qualities of doing good for others," has
extended this call for increased volunteerism into the 1990s. 25 Nev-
ertheless, FLSA statutory impediments still exist, prohibiting indi-
viduals from volunteering their services to generate productive
output in any business activity.26 Organizations will never satisfy
their need for volunteer labor if the federal courts and the DOL
continue to prohibit individuals from volunteering their services in a
productive capacity.
B. The Individual's Need to Volunteer
The current state of the law harms not only nonprofit organiza-
tions, but also certain classes of individuals seeking to volunteer.
For example, volunteer work may be the best way for individuals
with handicaps to learn skills and "prove" themselves as competent
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THIRTY EIGHT MILLION AMERICANS Do VOLUNTEER WORK (1990);
see also BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 130 (1988) (citing a 1982 survey
that identifies greater reliance on volunteer labor as "the single most frequently re-
ported coping strategy" for nonprofit organizations).
22 Id. See generally SUSAN J. EL.Is & KATHERINE H. NOYES, By THE PEOPLE (1990)
(chronicling the history of American volunteerism in such areas as labor, education,
child care, religion, civil rights, social welfare services, and government); LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS FROM A NA-
TIONAL SURVEY (1988) (surveying volunteer participation and charitable contributions at
nonprofit organizations throughout the 1980s); MICHAEL P. VAN BUREN, REACHING OUT:
AMERICA'S VOLUNTEER HERITAGE (1990) (detailing the history of American
volunteerism).
23 Couch, supra note 13, at 443. It is interesting to note, however, that "[a]lthough
strongly committed conceptually to encouraging the voluntary sector, the Reagan ad-
ministration... subsumed its policy toward the voluntary sector under its overall eco-
nomic program, which called for substantial cuts in government spending and in tax
rates in order to stimulate economic growth." Nonprofit Sector, supra note 14, at 175
(statement of Lester M. Salamon).
24 Couch, supra note 13, at 446. See generally ALAN J. ABRAMSON & LESTER M.
SALAMON, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND THE NEw FEDERAL BUDGET (1986) (detailing the
impact of the Reagan Administration's federal budget cuts on the nonprofit sector).
25 Jeffrey L. Sheler et al., The Push for National Service, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Feb. 13, 1989, at 20. President Bush for example, proposed a $35-$45 million Youth
Engaged in Service Program (YES) to encourage volunteer service in community
groups. Id
26 See infra notes 76-113 and accompanying text.
306 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:302
workers. Many individuals with disabilities, however, believe that
employer prejudice renders them unable to obtain competitive em-
ployment positions. 27 Although employers claim to hire on a non-
discriminatory basis, statistical evidence suggests otherwise.
According to 1980 census data,28 65.5% of working-age males with
disabilities and 80.6% of working-age females with disabilities are
unemployed. 29 While individuals with disabilities comprise almost
9% of the working-age population, only 27% of these individuals
are actually working.30 Although many individuals with disabilities
are quite capable of maintaining competitive employment, employ-
ers are often reluctant to offer them a job.31 Employer prejudice,
however, is not the only factor affecting these statistics; while many
individuals with disabilities are, indeed, employable, they sometimes
lack adequate skills to succeed in the workforce. 32
In order for individuals with disabilities to become more mar-
ketable, they must acquire abilities and skills through education and
training.33 Office work utilizing electronically based employment
27 RICHARD ROESSLER & BRIAN BOLTON, UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS VOCATIONAL RE-
HABILITATION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH EMPLOYABILITY SKILL DEFICITS at i (1984). Arkansas
Rehabilitation Services studied 57 former rehabilitation clients and reported on their
employability, skill training, and job placement needs. Id.; see also HAROLD E. YUKER,
ATI'ITUDES TOWARDS PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 251 (1988) (citing one study that re-
vealed that 477 of individuals with disabilities believe that employers deem them inca-
pable of satisfactory work performance because of their disabilities).
28 Census data from 1990 regarding employment of individuals with disabilities is
not yet available.
29 ROESSLER & BOLTON, supra note 27, at 1.
30 IAN MORRIS ET AL., THE FUTURE OF WORK FOR DISABLED PEOPLE 38 (1986). See
generally ROBERT L. BENNEFIELD & JOHN M. McNEIL, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE LABOR
FORCE STATUS AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS WITH A WORK DISABILITY, 1981
TO 1988 (Bureau of the Census, Series P-23, No. 160, 1989) (containing detailed U.S.
statistics on the employment of individuals with a work disability); COMPETITIVE EMPLOY-
MENT ISSUES AND STRATEGIES (Frank R. Rusch ed., 1986) (overviewing available research
on the employment of individuals with handicaps); DISABILITY AND WORK: INCENTIVES,
RIGHTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES (Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1991) (assessing what is needed to
get more individuals with disabilities into the workforce); ECONOMICS, INDUSTRY, AND
DISABILITY at xv (William E. Kiernan & Robert L. Schalock eds., 1989) ("By focusing on
economics, industry, and persons with disabilities, this book addresses key issues in the
employment picture for adults with severe disabilities.").
31 See LANCE Du RAND &JOHN Du RAND, THE AFFIRMATIVE INDUSTRY 8 (1978) ("If
these individuals [with disabilities] are to break the debilitating stigma under which they
have been forced to live, a stigma of incompetence and dependency, then they must be
involved in competent and socially recognizable activity.").
32 ROESSLER & BOLTON, supra note 27, at 3; see PAUL WEHMAN, COMPETITIVE EM-
PLOYMENT: NEW HORIZONS FOR SEVERELY DISABLED INDIVIDUALS 4 (1981) (noting that
"the Connecticut Division of Vocational Rehabilitation has pointed out that of approxi-
mately 12,000,000 potentially employable disabled persons only 4,100,000 are actually
working.").
33 MORRIS, supra note 30, at 40; see also WEHMAN, supra note 32, at ix (indicating that
several studies have demonstrated that even individuals with severe disabilities can
maintain competitive employment after acquiring necessary skills).
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situations, such as data entry, constitutes tasks that individuals with
disabilities can complete successfully. Relevant and quality career
education and training programs, however, are often unavailable to
individuals with disabilities.3 4 By allowing organizations to accept
volunteers with disabilities, the DOL and the federal courts can in-
crease the educational opportunities of some individuals through
on-the-job training programs. Such volunteer opportunities might
allow individuals to prove their "employability" to potential em-
ployers, thus increasing their chances of obtaining future gainful
employment, and reducing employer prejudice.3 5
Similarly, individuals who become disabled during their lifetime
face problems in re-entering ajob market where employer prejudice
abounds. Researchers at the Will Menninger Center for Applied
Behavioral Sciences estimate that every year over 569,000 workers
suffer serious physical disabilities that render them unable to work
for five months or longer.3 6 This number is projected to increase
thirty-five percent by the year 2020.37 Employers seldom expend
much energy in helping employees return to work after their reha-
bilitation, and only forty-eight percent of these workers actually do
return to work.38 One reason given for this low return rate is wide-
spread employer belief that employees with disabilities cannot main-
tain adequate production levels, even after a period of
It is clear that a primary barrier to community integration is not the skills
deficits of severely developmentally disabled individuals, but the lack of
sufficient integrated community vocational, residential, and recreational
opportunities and the absence of appropriate programs to train them in
the skills necessary to gain access to these communities.
Id.
34 MORRIS, supra note 30, at 45. See generally MICHAEL J. FrrZGERALD, THE HANDI-
CAPPED INDIVIDUAL AS AN ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF LABOR (1989) (evaluating both the
potential of individuals with disabilities to succeed in the workforce and the need for
employers to recognize this potential); THOMAS H. PowELL, SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT:
PROVIDING INTEGRATED EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PERSONS wrrH DISABILITIES
(1991) (studying the beneficial training effects of integrating individuals with disabilities
into office settings).
35 See NATIONAL REHABILITATION ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYMENT AND DISABILITY:
TRENDS AND ISSUES FOR THE 1990s 54 (Leonard G. Perlman & Carl E. Hansen eds.,
1990) (noting that "[tihe success of workers with disabilities will depend greatly upon
improved employer attitudes," and that "[a]s more individuals with disabilities enter the
work force and are seen as competent workers, improvements in hiring practices should
occur.").
36 EDWARDJ. HESTER ET AL., ATITUDES OF EMPLOYERS AND REHABILITATION PROFES-
SIONALS TOWARD EMPLOYEES WHO BECOME DISABLED vii (1988).
37 Id
38 Id. at 1; see also MONROE BERKOWITZ & M. ANNE HILL, DISABILITY AND THE LABOR
MARKET: ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS (1989) (summarizing papers
presented at a meeting on the economics of disability held in Washington, D.C. on April
9 and 10, 1985, and sponsored by the Bureau of Economic Research of Rutgers Univer-
sity). See generally ECONOMICS, INDUSTRY, AND DISABILITY, supra note 30 (discussing the
employment of individuals with disabilities after their rehabilitation).
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recuperation.3 9 Allowing individuals to volunteer part-time during,
or even after, their rehabilitation may help reduce employer preju-
dice by giving individuals with disabilities an opportunity to prove
that they can continue to perform adequately after becoming
disabled. 40
Recent college graduates also suffer from the prohibition on
volunteering in a productive capacity. Graduates face obstacles
while seeking employment in their field of study and often must take
positions in areas in which they receive no relevant career training
and experience. 41 Between 1960 and 1980, employment opportuni-
ties for recent graduates declined in terms ofjobs secured.42 A sub-
stantial number of recent graduates were forced to take lower-level
positions in which a college education was unnecessary and even
detrimental to satisfactory work performance. 43 This situation did
not improve during the next decade. In 1987, approximately thirty-
six percent of college graduates who found employment within one
year of graduation reported that their jobs were not related to their
field of study.44 In 1990, graduates of New England colleges faced
even more grim prospects of finding career-related employment,
and, as a result, many were forced to consider a variety of career and
advancement opportunities outside their course of study. 45 College
graduates who enter the job market throughout the next two de-
cades will likely encounter an even more competitive job market. 46
If the DOL and the federal courts allow recent graduates to volun-
39 HESTER ET AL., supra note 36, at 17-19.
40 See VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION AND SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT (Paul Wehman &
M. Sherill Moon eds., 1988) (showing the potential for individuals with disabilities to
perform well in the workforce, even during their rehabilitation).
41 See generally BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OUTLOOK FOR
NEW ENGLAND COLLEGE GRADUATES: 1990 (U.S.D.L.-18, 1990) [hereinafter, NEW ENG-
LAND GRADUATES];JOANELL PORTER, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONAL AND EDU-
CATIONAL OUTCOMES OF 1985-86 BACHELOR'S DEGREE RECIPIENTS (1989) [hereinafter
OCCUPATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES]; RUSSELL W. RUMBERGER, STANFORD UNI-
VERSITY SCHOOL OF EDUCATION REPORT No. 83-A3, THEJOB MARKET FOR COLLEGE GRAD-
UATES, 1960-1990 (1983). For a discussion of the beneficial educational effects of
volunteerism, see CECILIA I. DELVE ET AL., COMMUNITY SERVICE AS VALUES EDUCATION
(1990).
42 RUMBERGER, supra note 41, at 1-2.
43 Id. at 9-10. In 1960, approximately two-thirds of college graduates held profes-
sional and managerial positions, while one-third were employed in positions such as
secretaries and service workers. By 1970, this situation improved, as three out of four
college graduates held high level jobs. In 1980, however, job opportunities for young
college graduates had fallen below both 1970 and 1960 levels. Id.
44 OCCUPATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES, supra note 41, at iv. "Approxi-
mately 86 percent of all 1985-86 bachelor's degree recipients were employed [one] year
after graduation." Id. at iii.
45 NEW ENGLAND GRADUATES, supra note 41, at 1.
46 Kristina J. Shelley, The Future ofJobs for College Students, MONTHLY LAB. REV., July,
1992, at 13.
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teer in productive capacities that are relevant to their career aspira-
tions, these volunteers could receive valuable experience that might
lead to advancement opportunities.
The DOL and the federal courts, however, consistently refuse
to allow such individuals to volunteer to perform productive work.
This refusal stems from Congress's desire to enact an anti-poverty
device designed to prevent employer coercion, which was rampant
when the FLSA became law.47 An examination of the background of
the Act and the Congressional intent behind its passage, however,
suggests that Congress did not intend for the Act to be applied
strictly in situations where there is no evidence of employer
coercion. 48
II
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
A. The Historical Background of the Fair Labor Standards Act
In the early nineteenth century, various craft groups began to
petition their employers to limit their work days. 49 By the mid-
1800s, states began passing legislation that established a maximum
of eight to ten hours of work per day.50 These statutes, however,
failed to punish noncompliance. 51 It was not until the early 1900s
that the Supreme Court upheld legislation regulating hours
worked. 52 Throughout the next thirty years, several states at-
tempted to pass minimum wage laws, but two Supreme Court deci-
sions rejecting such legislation as violating substantive due process
left wages free from both national and local regulations.53
[A]pproximately 7 of 10 college graduates joining the labor force during
[this] period can expect to enter jobs requiting [sic] a college degree ....
In 1990, about 5.8 million college graduates were "educationally un-
derutilized," that is, they were employed in positions that usually do not
require a college degree or were unemployed at the time of the survey
.... [A] large number of graduates were in jobs that do not require a 4-
year degree because they could not find college-level jobs.
i45
47 See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 49-75 and accompanying text.
49 ROBERT N. COVINGTON & ALVIN L. GOLDMAN, LEGISLATION PROTECTING THE INDI-
VIDUAL EMPLOYEE 176 (1982).
50 I&
51 Id.
52 See Bunting v. Oregon 243 U.S. 426, 438 (1917) (upholding limits on hours
worked "in mills, factories, and manufacturing establishments" as a valid exercise of the
police powers of the state); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (upholding
legislation regulating maximum workday hours for women working in laundries).
53 COVINGTON & GoLDMAN, supra note 49, at 177; see also Morehead v. New York ex
reL Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936) (invalidating New York minimum wage law); Ad-
kins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 555 (1923) (finding a District of Columbia
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In 1937, however, the Supreme Court, in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,54 found that minimum wage laws were indeed compatible
with due process of law. The Court was asked to consider the con-
stitutionality of a Washington State law establishing minimum
wages and maximum hours for female employees. 55 In upholding
the wage and hour legislation, the Court concluded that a state leg-
islature may consider the fact that women as a class receive less pay,
have relatively weak bargaining power, and are ready victims for em-
ployer coercion. 56 Protecting women from coercive employers, the
Court reasoned, is a proper exercise of a state's police power.57
The Supreme Court's decision in West Coast Hotel, combined
with widespread unemployment and the employer abuses of the De-
pression era, prompted Congress to enact federal legislation regu-
lating hours worked and establishing minimum wages. 58 In an
attempt to liberate America from the effects of the Depression, Pres-
ident Roosevelt and his advisors proposed legislation designed to
improve living standards and to promote economic recovery.59 On
May 24, 1937, President Roosevelt urged Congress to enact legisla-
tion" 'to help those who toil in factory and on farm' to obtain 'a fair
day's pay for a fair day's work.' "60 In 1938, after a year of legisla-
tive struggle over the form of the proposed bill, Congress enacted
the Fair Labor Standards Act.61
Congress has amended the original Act, which embraces wage,
hour, and child labor regulation, eight times, and has extended its
coverage to over seventy-three million American workers. 62 Cover-
age includes employees of enterprises engaged in interstate com-
minimum wage law violative of due process for its failure to consider the value of serv-
ices rendered).
54 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
55 Id. at 380.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 RONNIE STEINBERG, WAGES AND HOURS: LABOR AND REFORM IN TwENTIETH-CEN-
TURY AMERICA 109-15 (1982); see JOSEPH E. KALET, PRIMER ON WAGE & HOUR LAWS 3
(1990) (stating that "the Great Depression led to widespread unemployment, the scar-
city ofjobs was perceived as an invitation to wage abuses by employers who knew that it
was a 'buyer's market' for labor, particularly since many industries were not covered by
either state or federal wage-hours laws."); see also Willis J. Nordlund, A Brief History of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 39 LABOR LJ. 715 (1988) (citing the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act, which Congress later repealed, as a strong precedent for the FLSA).
59 Nordlund, supra note 58, at 719.
60 Joseph V. Lane, Jr., Is the Fair Labor Standards Act Fairly Construed, 13 FORDHAM L.
REV. 60, 65 (1944); see also Stephen G. Wood & Mary Anne Q. Wood, The Fair Labor
Standard Act: Recommendations to Improve Compliance, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 529, 530 (1983)
(noting that the FLSA is often called "the original anti-poverty law").
61 COVINGTON & GOLDMAN, supra note 49, at 179.
62 See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT:
SELECTED ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES 1 (1988).
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merce or in the production of goods for travel in interstate
commerce.6 3 The Act affects both private and public sector employ-
ees64 and places a floor under wages and a ceiling over hours
worked.65 The FLSA also details various exemptions from coverage
and provides procedures for the administration and enforcement of
the Act.66 The Act is silent, however, on many aspects of employ-
ment, including:67 vacation, holiday, severance, and sick pay; length
of vacation periods; overtime pay for weekends and holidays; raises;
and fringe benefits.68
B. The Legislative Intent Behind the Fair Labor Standards Act
In passing the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress sought to
promote "simple, humanitarian, objectives.. ." by establishing min-
imum wages, discouraging unusually long work weeks, and eliminat-
ing oppressive child labor.69 Congress intended for the Act to be
"the most comprehensive and pervasive federal statute in this
area." 70 A Senate committee report describing the legislation
63 Id. Congress first amended the Act in 1949 and increased the minimum wage
from 40 cents to 75 cents an hour. Id. at 178. In 1961, Congress raised the minimum
wage to $1.25 and broadened the Act to include enterprises with gross annual revenue
of $1 million and at least one employee engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce. In 1966, Congress again amended the FLSA. An equal pay for
equal work standard known as the "Equal Pay Act" was added to protect female employ-
ees, and coverage was extended to state and local government employees. The 1966
amendments also extended coverage to some classes of federal employees, including
employees of naval facilities and the Armed Forces. Id at 178-79. Congress also low-
ered the annual volume of sales needed to bring an enterprise under the Act and modi-
fied some previous exemptions. These amendments also extended the FLSA to state
and local hospitals and educational institutions. With its 1974 amendments, Congress
brought virtually all federal and state employees under the Act's coverage. In 1977, new
minimum wage rates were adopted. The 1985 amendments brought state and local gov-
ernment employees under the Act's coverage. KALET, supra note 58, at 4-5. The FLSA
Amendments of 1989, the most recent amendments, raised the hourly minimum wage to
$4.25, established a subminimum training wage for teenage workers, increased the
amount of tip credit that can be applied to a worker's minimum wage, and modified the
definition of "covered enterprise" to include all institutions with a volume of business in
excess of $500,000 per year. Id.
64 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). The FLSA treats employees of public agencies as govern-
ment employees. Id. For a discussion of the FLSA's application to state and local gov-
ernment workers, see Austin J. Murphy & Don Nickles, The Fair Labor Standards Act
Amendments of 1985, 37 LABOR LJ. 67 (1986); Todd D. Steenson, The Public Sector Compen-
satory Time Exception to the Fair Labor Standards Act: Trying to Compensate for Congress's Lack of
Clarity, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1804 (1991).
65 29 U.S.C. § 203.
66 29 U.S.C. §§ 211-19.
67 See BETTY S. MURPHY & ELLIOT S. AZOFF, GUIDE TO WAGE AND HOUR REGULATION
3 (1987).
68 Id
69 See RAYMOND S. SMETHURST & REUBEN S. HASLAM, CASES ON FAIR LABOR STAN-
DARDS Acr OF 1938 Foreword (1949).
70 KALET, supra note 58, at v.
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stated that this law would not affect most employers' and employ-
ees' right to contract for their own terms of employment. 71 The re-
port further noted that "[i]t is only those low-wage and long-
working-hour industrial workers, who are the helpless victims of
their own bargaining weakness, that this bill seeks to assist to obtain
a minimum wage." 72 Similarly, the House Committee on Labor's
report indicated that the House of Representatives also intended
the legislation to affect only the most poorly paid and overworked
employees. 73 Indeed, Congress intended the FLSA to ameliorate
"'labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well
being...' without 'substantially curtailing employment or earning
power.' "74 Despite the clear language of the congressional reports,
the Department of Labor and most federal and state courts have
ignored Congress' original, narrow intent and imposed mandatory
minimum wage provisions on all individuals considered "employ-
ees" under the FLSA. 75
71 S. REP. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937). But see Vadino v. A. Valey
Eng'rs, 903 F.2d 253, 265 (3rd Cir. 1990) (holding that FLSA provisions cannot be
abridged by contract).
72 See S. REP. No. 884, supra note 71, at 3-4.
73 See H.R. REP. No. 1452, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., at 9 (1937) (noting that the FLSA
"only attempts in a modest way to raise the wages of the most poorly paid workers and
to reduce the hours of those most overworked.").
74 BELTON M. FLEISHER, MINIMUM WAGE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 5
(1983) (quoting MINIMUM WAGE STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE
STUDY COMMISSION 3 (1981)).
75 See infra notes 130-73 and accompanying text. The FLSA has nevertheless
proven to be somewhat ineffective as an anti-poverty device and has had the unintended
effect of decreasing, rather than increasing, employment opportunities. See FLEISHER,
supra note 74, at 77. Fleisher evaluates the minimum wage law's success as an "anti-
poverty device" and concludes that minimum wage costs substantially outweigh any
modest benefits that might result from their application. Id. at 10. Companies, in re-
sponse to increases in the minimum wage, may be forced to fire some of their low-wage
workers, with this reduction in employment leading to decreased production. Id. at 11.
Employees who remain may receive fewer fringe benefits and work under less desirable
conditions. Furthermore, these low-wage workers may have to obtain employment at
establishments that are not subject to the FLSA, where they will receive subminimum
wages. Fleisher also observes that these individuals may lose valuable workforce experi-
ence, thus reducing their future earning power and increasing their chances of falling
into poverty later in life. Fleisher refers to a "preponderance of evidence ... that the
economy-wide and industry-specific disemployment effects of minimum wages on all
minimum wage workers as well as on youth is to reduce average earnings, contrary to the
intent of the law." Id. at 63-64. Fleisher concludes that federal minimum wage legisla-
tion has failed as an anti-poverty device, and suggests that Congress should freeze the
current minimum wage permanently. Id. at 77.
Minimum wage legislation may produce even more negative effects in the years
ahead. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 8 (1992). In 1990, 125 million workers comprised the civilian la-
bor force. The DOL projects that this figure will increase to 151 million individuals by
the year 2005. This increase amounts to slightly more than one-half of the increase that
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C. The Establishment of the Employer-Employee Relationship
The Fair Labor Standards Act defines an "employee" as "any
individual employed by an employer."' 76 "Employ" is defined as "to
suffer or permit to work." 77 The Act defines "employer" as "any
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee."' 78 When an employer "suffers" or "per-
mits" another to work, an employment relationship under the FLSA
results, regardless of the parties' intentions. 79
In determining whether an employer-employee relationship
exists within the meaning of the Act, courts look to the particular
facts surrounding the relationship.80 For example, courts employ
an "economic realities" test to determine whether an individual is
an "employee" or an "independent contractor" exempt from the
Act's provisions.81 Relevant factors include the degree of employer
control over the work performed, the employee's opportunity for
profit and loss, the employee's investment in equipment and materi-
als used to perform the work, the skill required to perform the work,
the duration of the working relationship, and the level of service
the United States experienced from 1975-90. Id at 10. In 1990, the poverty rate re-
mained disturbingly high, even after a seven-year economic expansion. See SAR A. LEVI-
TAN & FRANK GALLO, WORKFORCE STATIsTIcs: Do WE KNow WHAT WE THINK WE
KNow-AND WHAT SHOULD WE KNow? vii (1989). Throughout this period of economic
expansion, wage and productivity growth remained sluggish, and skill deficiencies
plagued many workers. Id. at 1. Because the FLSA is proving ineffective as an anti-
poverty device, it is unwise for federal courts and the DOL to construe the Act narrowly
and prevent beneficial volunteer activities that increase both employer productivity and
employee skills. See also AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH,
MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION 1 (1977) (exploring the "perverse effect" that minimum
wage legislation may have on the distribution of income).
76 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1).
77 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(B); see Hill v. U.S., 751 F.2d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 817 (1985) (defining "work" as "physical or mental exertion for em-
ployer's benefit as well as standby or waiting time.").
78 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). The definition of employer "includes a public agency, but
does not include any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer) or
anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization." Id.
79 See MURPHY & AzoFF, supra note 67, at 4; 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A)(i)-(ii) (Supp.
1992) (excluding from the FLSA's definition of employee "any individual who volun-
teers to perform services for a public agency which is a State, political subdivision of a
State, or an interstate governmental agency" if the individual receives nominal or no
compensation for these services, and these services are not the same as are required by
her paid employment at the agency). Id. Employer coverage under the FLSA is deter-
mined by the 1989 amendment establishing a $500,000 annual gross sales threshold. Id.
If a firm has less than $500,000 in annual gross sales, the firm's employees may still be
subject to the mandatory minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Act. KALET,
supra note 58, at 19. Public agencies, hospitals, and health care facilities are not subject
to this dollar volume test and therefore are always subject to the Act's provisions, even if
their gross income is less than $500,000. Id.
80 See MURPHY & AzoFF, supra note 67, at 4.
81 Id at 4-5.
CORNELL L4 W REVIEW
provided to integral aspects of the employer's business.8 2 Similarly,
the DOL examines all facts and circumstances of a particular case to
determine whether or not an individual is an employee or is other-
wise covered by an exception to the Act.8 3
D. The Exceptions
The FLSA maintains a complex scheme of exceptions to the Act
for various volunteer services.8 4 Exceptions exist for certain em-
ployees in specified industries, as well as for employees having spec-
ified responsibilities. Congress created these various exceptions
with the belief that coverage of such employees is inconsistent with
the FLSA's purpose.8 5 In determining whether an individual is a
"volunteer" rather than an "employee" under the Act, the DOL
considers who receives the benefits of the individual's work, how
long it takes to render the services, and whether the services are
typical volunteer activities.8" "Individuals who volunteer or donate
their services, usually on a part-time basis, for public service, reli-
gious or humanitarian objectives, not as employees and without
contemplation of pay, are not considered as employees of the reli-
gious, charitable and similar nonprofit corporations which receive
their services."8 7 Examples of such volunteers include students vol-
unteering at nursing homes and hospitals, parents assisting at their
children's schools, and camp counselors participating in youth pro-
grams.88 The DOL reasons that these duties do not establish an
employer-employee relationship because the volunteer does not ex-
pect compensation for her services and is working toward
82 Id. at 5 (citing Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754 n.14 (9th
Cir. 1979)).
83 Id. at 6.
84 Some exceptions suspend only the minimum wage and overtime requirements,
while others suspend the minimum wage, overtime, equal pay, and child labor require-
ments. KALET, supra note 58, at 25-26.
85 Id.
86 Id. "Exemptions are figured on a workweek basis. Varying duties may mean that
an employee is exempt in one week and not the next." Minimum Wages and Overtime Pay,
235 LAB. L. REP. 11 (CCH) (April 5, 1991).
87 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 6.
88 Id. at 6-7. Apart from these narrow exemptions, the DOL does not otherwise
distinguish between for-profit and nonprofit corporations; therefore, the same stringent
rules apply to both corporate forms. See S. Rep. N. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. (80 Stat.) 3002, 3010 (stating that, because non-
profit corporations are engaged in competition with for-profit corporations coverage of
a nonprofit corporation furthers the purpose of the FLSA to eliminate unfair competi-
tion in interstate commerce); see also 29 C.F.R. § 779.214 (1991) (defining "business
purpose" as including commercial activities performed for charitable organizations).
On two occasions, Congress rejected proposals to exempt nonprofit organizations from
FLSA coverage. See 106 CONG. REC. 16703-04 (1960) and 107 CONG. REC. 6254-55
(1961).
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humanitarian objectives. 89 An employee is not displaced when
these services are performed, and the donated services are "not
considered compensable 'work.' "90
Also exempt from the FLSA's definition of "employee" are
"[p]ersons such as nuns, monks, priests, lay brothers, ministers,
deacons, and other members of religious orders who serve pursuant
to their religious obligations in schools, hospitals and other institu-
tions operated by the church or religious order." 91 Because these
individuals expect no compensation and are working exclusively for
"their own advantage," they fall outside of the Act.92
The DOL has also carved out exceptions for individuals with
disabilities, trainees, and student learners in order to "prevent cur-
tailment of opportunities in employment."' 93 For example, the
FLSA allows an employer to apply to the DOL for a "special mini-
mum wage" certificate entitling it to pay an individual with a disabil-
ity a subminimum wage.94 In determining whether to certify the
employer to pay a subminimum wage, the DOL considers whether
an individual's skills are commensurate with the minimum wage.95
If the individual's earning capacity is not impaired in relation to the
work performed, the DOL will deny certification and require the
employer to pay the individual at least the applicable minimum
wage.96 If the individual's productivity is inferior to that of a
nondisabled worker performing the same type of work, the DOL
may authorize the employer to pay a special minimum wage that is
commensurate with the individual's skills. 97
Another exception to the Act exists for "trainees." 98 Six crite-
ria are used to determine whether an individual is a trainee and thus
exempt from the FLSA wage provisions. 99 In order to be consid-
89 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 6.
90 Id.
91 Id. at7.
92 Id. If these same individuals seek employment with "a State or secular institu-
tion," an employer-employee relationship is established, and these individuals must be
compensated regardless of their religious objectives. Id.
93 Minimum Wages and Overtime Pay, supra note 86, at 18.
94 29 C.F.R. § 525 (1989).
95 29 C.F.R. § 525.3(i) (1989).
96 Id
97 Id. § § 525.3(i), 525.12. In considering whether or not to certify an employer, the
DOL considers the nature and extent of the individual's disability, the prevailing rates of
pay for experienced individuals who are not disabled, the output of both the individuals
with disabilities and those without, and the wage rates that the employer is requesting in
comparison to the wage rates paid to individuals without disabilities for comparable
work. § 525.12.
98 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 4-5.
99 Id.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ered a trainee and not an employee under the Act, an individual
must meet all six of the following criteria:
(1) the training, even though it includes actual operation of the
facilities of the employer, is similar to that which would be given
in a vocational school;
(2) the training is for the benefit of the trainees ...
(3) the trainees... do not displace regular employees, but work
under their close observation;
(4) the employer that provides the training derives no immediate
advantage from the activities of the trainees... ; and on occasion
his operations may actually be impeded;
(5) the trainees . . . are not necessarily entitled to a job at the
conclusion of the training period; and,
(6) the employer and the trainees ... understand that the trainees
... are not entitled to wages for the time spent in training.100
"Student learners" also fall under an FLSA exception to the
definition of "employee."' 10 1 The implementing regulations define
a "student learner" as "a student who is receiving instruction in an
accredited school, college or university and who is employed on a
part-time basis, pursuant to a bona fide vocational training pro-
gram."' 0 2 When hiring a student learner under this FLSA excep-
tion, the employing agency must apply for a special certificate
entitling the employer to pay a subminimum wage. 0 3 The Depart-
ment of Labor exempts student learners from the FLSA's require-
ments because it views the learner as deriving an educational benefit
from the work, which may lead to future, gainful employment. 0 4
As a basic rule, individuals employed in a "bona fide executive,
administrative, or professional capacity (including... academic ad-
ministrative personnel or teacher[s] ... )" and outside sales people
are also exempt from the minimum wage and overtime require-
ments of the Act if they meet the tests set forth for each category. 10 5
100 Id.
101 29 C.F.R. § 520.2(a) (1991).
102 Id. § 520.2(a).
103 Id. § 520.3(a).
104 See 29 U.S.C. § 214(a) (Supp. 1992).
105 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (Supp. 1992); see also MURPHY & AZOFF, supra note 67, at
11-12 (describing the criteria that individuals must satisfy in order to qualify as executive
employees, administrative employees, and professional employees); Minimum Wages &
Overtime Pay, supra note 86, at 11-15 (describing the specific duties, responsibilities, and
salary standards for the three "white collar" categories). Other exceptions include indi-
viduals employed at amusement parks or seasonal recreational establishments, fisher-
men, persons working for a newspaper whose circulation is under four thousand, and
telephone operators. Id. at 11. Also excluded are seamen, babysitters, outside buyers of
dairy products, and employees of common carriers. Id. at 11-12. Announcers, news
editors, and chief engineers at a radio or television station in a town with a population of
under 100,000 residents, unless the town is part of a larger metropolitan area, or a town
that has under 25,000 residents and is at least 40 airline miles from a major metropoli-
316 [Vol. 78:302
1993] NOTE-FLSA RESTRICTIONS ON VOLUNTEERISM 317
These are known as the "white-collar exemptions."1 06 Individuals
are exempt from the Act's requirements if they allocate less than
forty percent of their weekly hours "to activities not directly or
closely related to the performance of executive or administrative
activities." 107
The DOL also exempts independent contractors from FLSA
coverage because the unusual degree of independence enjoyed by
the contractor is contrary to an employer-employee relationship.10 8
The DOL applies an "economic realities" test that considers
whether the worker is economically dependent for her livelihood
upon the employer to whom she renders service.10 9 If the DOL
finds a very low degree of economic dependence, the DOL will usu-
ally deem the worker an independent contractor who is thus exempt
from the Act's provisions. 01 All other non-exempt individuals"'
are assumed to be employees covered by the Act. 1 2 The DOL and
the federal courts strictly construe the Act's exemptions and resolve
any doubt in favor of employee coverage. 1 3
tan city, are exempt as well. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (b)(9) (1988). Persons engaged in the
transportation industry, some agricultural workers, taxicab drivers, volunteer firemen,
individuals employed in domestic service, and operators of movie theaters are also ex-
empt. Id § 213(a)-(b). For more information on the FLSA's exemptions for agriculture
workers, see Patrick M. Anderson, The Agricultural Employee Exemption from the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 649 (1989); Phillip L. Kunkel, American Agricul-
tural Law Association Symposium, 12 HAMLINE L. REv. 477 (1989).
106 KALET, supra note 58, at 26.
107 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1988).
108 Id. § 213(a).
109 KALEr, supra note 58, at 32; see CHARLES G. BAxLAY, JR. & JOEL M. GROSSMAN,
THE MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 16-21 (1991) (describing the applica-
tion of the "economic realities" test to independent contractors).
110 KALEr, supra note 58, at 32; see Huntley v. Grunn Furniture Co., 79 F. Supp. 110,
114 (W.D. Mich. 1948) (holding that the Act's definition of employee does not include
an individual over whose hours the employer has no control and has no obligation to
pay wages).
111 See Minimum Wages and Overtime Pay, supra note 86, at 11-12. Other individuals are
exempt from the full overtime requirements of the FLSA. Such individuals include em-
ployees of certain motor carriers, some employees of railroads, express companies,
water carriers, and air carriers. Id. at 12. Partial overtime pay exemptions are extended
to various employees, including law enforcement and fire fighting personnel, private
hospital and nursing home employees, wholesale petroleum distributors, some union
members pursuant to their employment contracts, and commission employees of retail
service establishments. Id
112 See Power v. United States Cartridge Co. 339 U.S. 497, 517 (1950) (holding that,
in the absence of an express exemption, courts must assume that Congress did not in-
tend to exclude such individuals); see also Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir.
1941) (holding that exemptions must not be construed beyond their literal
interpretation).
113 See Calafv. Gonzalez, 127 F.2d 934 (1st Cir. 1942).
318 CORNELL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 78:302
E. Enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act
In order to enforce the Act's mandatory minimum wage and
overtime provisions, Congress created detailed administrative and
enforcement procedures for the FLSA." 14 The President authorizes
the Secretary of Labor to administer the Act. 115 The Secretary of
Labor, through her designated representative, the Wage and Hour
Division, 1 6 investigates employment practices to determine FLSA
violations. 117
Employers who are subject to the Act's provisions must keep
records of wages. 1S If a violation is alleged, the employer must
submit the records to the Secretary of Labor "as necessary or appro-
priate for the enforcement of the provisions of this [Act]." ' 1 9 Most
employers must also "post a notice in the workplace informing em-
ployees of the applicability of the [Act's] minimum wage and over-
time provisions." 120 One or more employees, for themselves or for
those similarly situated, may bring suit against their employer for
violations of the Act in a federal or state court of competent jurisdic-
tion. 121 Alternatively, the Secretary of Labor may bring suit in fed-
114 29 U.S.C. §§ 204-218 (1988).
115 29 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1988).
116 See EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 1. The Wage and Hour
Division administers the Act "with respect to private employment, State and local gov-
ernment employment, and Federal employees of the Library of Congress, U.S. Postal
Service, Postal Rate Commission and the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Office of
Personnel Management is responsible for administering the Act with regard to all other
Federal employees." Id.; see also UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FAIR LA-
BOR STANDARDS ACT: SELECTED ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES (1988) [hereinafter GAO SE-
LECTED ISSUES] (providing specific information regarding background and statistical
information about the DOL's enforcement of the FLSA).
117 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1988). "While most investigations originate from com-
plaints, Wage and Hour also initiates its own investigations, known as directed investiga-
tions." GAO SELECTED ISSUES, supra note 116, at 6 n.1. In 1987, the Wage and Hour
divisons conducted 42,367 FLSA investigations. Id. at 6. In 1984, the DOL conducted
over 73,000 compliance investigations and disclosed $130 million in unpaid wages. See
Minimum Wages & Overtime Pay, 688 LAB. L. REP. 3 (CCH) (May 3, 1985). For a discus-
sion of early employer violations of the FLSA, see Albert B. Gerber & S. Harry Galfand,
Employees' Suits under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 505 (1946).
118 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (Supp. 1992).
119 Id The employer is also required to keep information on employees who are
exempt from the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA. 27 C.F.R.
§ 516.11 (1991). If all of the employer's employees are exempt from the FLSA, how-
ever, the employer is not required to keep the records required by the Act. 29 C.F.R.
§ 516.1 (1991).
120 MURPHY & AZOFF, supra note 67, at 58.
121 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1992). MURPHY & AZOFF, supra note 67, at 61.
Although class action suits cannot be brought under the Act, employees may bring "col-
lective actions" in which other "employees . . . 'opt in' to be bound by the judgment."
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1992). If an employee chooses to become a "party plaintiff"
to a suit, she must file a decree of consent with the court in which the action is brought.
1993] NOTE-FLSA RESTRICTIONS ON VOLUNTEERISM 319
eral court seeking civil remedies, subject to a two-year statute of
limitations, 22 for violations of the Act's wage and hour provi-
sions. 123 If the Secretary of Labor files a complaint seeking injunc-
tive relief for violations of the minimum wage or overtime
provisions, an employee's right to bring suit is terminated.' 24 The
Secretary of Labor may also seek back wages for noncompliance
with the Act.' 25 Damages awarded include reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs. 1 26
Upon conviction for violating the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the FLSA, an employer will "be subject to a fine of not
more than $10,000, or to imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both."'127 The employer is also liable to the affected em-
ployee for unpaid minimum or overtime wages, as well as liquidated
damages.' 28 An employer who unlawfully discharges or discrimi-
nates against an employee for exercising rights covered by the Act is
liable for legal and equitable relief, "including without limitation
employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages
lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages."' 29
III
CASE LAW INTERPRETING THE FLSA
In the 1947 case of Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,130 the
Supreme Court considered whether railroad workers taking a
course in practical training were employees under the FLSA. The
railroad company required prospective yard brakeman to complete
a week-long, unpaid training course before it would accept an appli-
122 Id. § 216.
123 29 U.S.C. § 217. The 1963 amendments that require equal pay for equal work
(the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206) are enforced by private parties.
124 29 U.S.C. § 216(c). However, if an FLSA cause of action arises from a "willful
violation," a three-year statute of limitations applies. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).
125 29 U.S.C. § 216(c).
126 Id. § 216(b). From 1938 until 1987, the Wage and Hour Division of the Depart-
ment of Labor took over 2.6 million compliance actions. See Nordlund, supra note 58, at
727. Between 1946 and 1987, damages awarded for back wages exceeded $2.5 billion.
Id. at 728. Between 1951 and 1987, over 6.6 million employees were owed back pay for
minimum wage violations, and 8.5 million workers were owed back pay due to overtime
violations. Id. at 727.
127 29 U.S.C. § 216(a). A 1980 study estimated that the noncompliance rate for em-
ployers is five percent. See Nordlund, supra note 58, at 728. See also JOHN A. HUGHES,
OPERMATNG UNDER T E FEDERAL WAGE-HOUR LAws 41 (1968) (stating that only a "small
percentage of violations result from an honest disagreement by an employer, whether he
is covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act... because he believes that his employees
are not covered by the act in question or if so, that they are being paid properly.").
128 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1992).
129 Id
130 330 U.S. 148 (1947).
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cation for employment.13' The Court's examination of the FLSA's
language and legislative history revealed that imposing a minimum
wage on persons with little vocational experience defeated a primary
purpose of the Act: "to increase opportunities for gainful
employment." 132
The Court concluded that the Act's definition of" 'employ' ...
was obviously not intended to stamp all ... employees who, without
any express or implied compensation agreement, might work for
their own advantage on the premises of another."' 133 The Court
stated that an individual "who, without promise or expectation of
compensation, but solely for his personal purpose or pleasure,
worked in activities carried on by other persons either for their plea-
sure or profit" was not an employee covered by the Act if the indi-
vidual's work served only the individual's own interests.' 34 The
Supreme Court further stated that Congress did not intend the Act
to penalize organizations for providing free services and training. 35
A major factor in the Court's decision was that the employer re-
ceived "no 'immediate advantage' from any work done by train-
ees." 136 The Court thus articulated an exclusive benefits test: if an
individual worked "solely" for her personal purpose or pleasure and
the employer received no "immediate advantage" from the individ-
ual's work, the worker was not an "employee" under the Act.' 3 7 In
refusing to exempt all individuals receiving training, the Court
hoped to avoid wholesale evasions that might result from a blanket
exemption. 38
One year after Walling, a federal district court in McComb v. Con-
solidated Fisheries Co. ' 39 took an even narrower view of the exemp-
tions. The court considered whether the FLSA applied "to certain
employees such as a cook, a watchman, maintenance men and cer-
tain office employees of a corporation."' 140 In concluding that these
individuals were employees, the court stated that a strict construc-
tion of the Act's exemptions was necessary to ensure liberal cover-
131 Id. at 149.
132 Id. at 151.
133 Id at 152. The Court interpreted section 14 of the Act as empowering the DOL
with the discretion to issue employers certificates to pay student learners, trainees, and
handicapped workers subminimum wages. Id. at 151.
134 Id. at 152.
135 Id. at 153.
136 Id. The Court further stated that the "Act's purpose as to wages was to ensure
that every person whose employment contemplated compensation should not be com-
pelled to sell his services for less than the prescribed minimum wage." Id. at 152.
137 Id. at 153.
138 Id.
139 75 F. Supp. 798 (D. Del. 1948), aff'd 174 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1949).
140 Id. at 799-800.
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age of the Act "so as to embrace every employer or employee
coming reasonably within its scope." 14 1
In 1971, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit interpreted the exceptions more broadly. In Isaacson v. Penn
Community Services, Inc.,142 the court considered whether a conscien-
tious objector working at a nonprofit corporation in lieu of military
service was subject to the minimum wage and hour provisions of the
FLSA.143 The conscientious objector was receiving a subsistence
wage for the work he performed in a position that the nonprofit cor-
poration created specifically for volunteers "performing alternative
service as conscientious objectors."1 44 Applying the Walling ration-
ale, the court found that, since the nonprofit corporation was deriv-
ing no "immediate advantage" from the objector's work, the
objector was not subject to the provisions of the Act. 145
In finding that the corporation received no "immediate advan-
tage," the court created a distinction in the Act's applicability to
nonprofit and for-profit corporations. While it could not be said
that the nonprofit corporation "received no benefit from [the con-
scientious objector's] services," the organization's corporate pur-
pose was beneficial to the public at large, albeit in "a different
nature than that of a for-profit enterprise."' 46 In a nonprofit organ-
ization, such as a hospital, museum, or school, where individuals
often volunteer in well known capacities, "the Wage-Hour Adminis-
tration has deemed such persons not employees covered by the Act,
despite the fact that no single exemption . . .in the Act excludes
them."147 The court further stated that the principal beneficiary of
the relationship was the conscientious objector and not the non-
profit organization.1 48
The court thus qualified the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Walling. The analysis shifted from who received the exclusive benefit
of the individual's work to who received the principal benefit.149 The
Fourth Circuit justified this change by arguing that the employment
relationship in Isaacson was substantially different from that in Wall-
141 Id. at 800; see also Dole v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 889 F.2d 543, 546 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding that courts should construe exemptions to the Act narrowly and that the
employer should have the burden of proof), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 929 (1990); Luther v. Z.
Wilson, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (holding that the Act must be narrowly
construed).
142 450 F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1971).
143 I.
144 Id. at 1307.
145 Id. at 1309.
146 Id. at 1309-10.
147 Id. at 1309.
148 Id. at 1310.
149 Id.
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ing. While Penn Community Services was a nonprofit enterprise
whose primary corporate purpose was to further the public good,
Portland Terminal's primary corporate purpose was profit max-
imization. 150 Isaacson's "principal benefit" was an "opportunity to
perform work of national importance to his liking."' 15 1
Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Tony & Susan Alamo
Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,152 the Supreme Court failed to distin-
guish between nonprofit and for-profit corporations, and again ap-
plied Walling's exclusive benefits test in considering whether
associates who worked at a nonprofit religious foundation where
they received food and shelter were employees covered by the
FLSA. 153 Most of the Foundation's employees were former drug
addicts, derelicts, and criminals. The Foundation fostered the reha-
bilitation of these individuals by employing them in the "operation
of a number of commercial businesses, which include[d] . . . con-
struction companies, a recordkeeping company, a motel, and com-
panies engaged in the production and distribution of candy."' 54
The Court stated that, since the FLSA contains "no express or im-
plied exception for commercial activities conducted by religious or
other nonprofit organizations," activities in a nonprofit setting re-
quire compensation if individuals perform them for a "business pur-
pose." 155 The Court held that a business purpose exists "where
such organizations engage in ordinary commercial activities, such as
operating a printing and publishing plant, the business activities will
be treated under the Act the same as when they are performed by
the ordinary business enterprise."'' 56
150 Id. at 1309.
151 Id. at 1310.
152 471 U.S. 290 (1985). See also Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210
F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1954) (holding that the FLSA applies to a church's employees who
print and mail religious literature), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954).
153 471 U.S. at 290. "The Statute contains no express or implied exception for com-
mercial activities conducted by religious or other nonprofit organizations, and the
agency charged with its enforcement has consistently interpreted the statute to reach
such businesses." Id. at 296-97 (footnote omitted). The Alamo Foundation's purpose
for incorporation was to render assistance to the sick and needy. Id at 292. For a dis-
cussion of Tony & Susan Alamo, see Terry A. Bethel, Recent Labor Law Decisions of the
Supreme Court, 45 MD. L. REv. 179, 235-39 (1986).
154 471 U.S. at 292 (footnote omitted).
155 Id. at 296-97 (footnote omitted).
156 Id. at 297 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 779.214 (1984)). The following Senate Commit-
tee Report, which discusses the "business purpose" requirement, was rejected.
[T]he definition would not include eleemosynary, religious, or educa-
tional organizations not operated for profit. The key word in the defini-
tion which supports this conclusion is the word "business." Activities of
organizations of the type referred to, if they are not operated for profit,
are not activities performed for a "business" purpose.
Id. at 297 n.14 (quoting S. REP. No. 1744, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1960)). In 1961, this
same amendment was proposed and again rejected. Id. at 298 n.17. See also Souder v.
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Nevertheless, the Court stated that, even though an enterprise
falls under the Act's coverage, it does not necessarily follow that the
Act covers all of the enterprise's workers. 157 The Court, citing Wall-
ing, stated that an individual who receives training on the premises
of another and works exclusively for her own advantage, such as a
student or a trainee, is exempt from the Act's minimum wage and
overtime provisions. 158 Although the petitioners intended to re-
ceive no monetary compensation for their work, the Court held that
the individuals were nevertheless performing business activities
which contemplated receipt of food and shelter, benefits which were
"wages in another form."' 159 Stating that the Act "does not require
the payment of cash wages," the Court held the FLSA applicable. 160
Even if the individuals received cash wages, the Court stated that
nothing in the Act prevents them from donating these wages to the
Foundation.161
Further, the Court stated that even vehement protestations of
workers that they are not employees and do not "expect [] compen-
sation" are not dispositive of whether the Act covers the individu-
als. 162 An employee cannot waive any of the Act's provisions. 163
According to the Court, the Act's very purpose requires courts to
apply it to workers wishing to forego its protection. 164 Indeed, "[i]f
an exception to the Act were carved out for employees willing to
testify that they performed work 'voluntarily,' employers might be
able to use superior bargaining power to coerce employees to make
such assertions, or to waive their protections under the Act."' 165
The Court, however, stated that "ordinary volunteerism,"
volunteerism that does not "contemplate compensation," such as
driving the elderly to work or serving at soup kitchens, would re-
main immune from the provisions of the Act.' 66 Any "business" or
Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that mental health institution must
pay the minimum wage to their patients who work for purposes of rehabilitation and
treatment if they confer an economic benefit on the institution). For a critique of Souder,
see James G. Blaine &John H. Mason, Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Patient
Work Programs at Mental Health Institutions: A Proposal for Change, 27 B.C. L. REv. 553
(1987).
157 471 U.S. at 300.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 301.
160 Id. at 303-04.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 301-02.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 302. The Court also stated that "[s]uch exceptions to coverage would af-
fect many more people than those workers directly at issue in this case and would be
likely to exert a general downward pressure on wages in competing businesses." Id.
166 Id. at 302-03.
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"commercial activities" conducted at nonprofit organizations, how-
ever, necessarily fall under the Act's mandatory minimum wage and
overtime provisions. 167
In 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, in McLaughlin v. Ensley, 168 considered whether trainees at a
snack food distributor were entitled to compensation under the
FLSA for a week-long orientation program during which they ac-
companied and assisted experienced routemen. 169 In holding that
the trainees were employees within the meaning of the Act, the
court applied a principal benefits test by asking whether the trainee
or the employer was the principal beneficiary of the work. 170 The
court's application of this test weighed the advantages to the em-
ployee against the advantages to the employer. The court deter-
mined that the distributor received more advantage than the
employees from the work because the employees had greater job-
specific skills after this training period. 171 Furthermore, the em-
ployer was able to reviewjob performance for his regular, paid, full-
time employees that received help on their routes.1 72 While the
Fourth Circuit ruling somewhat relaxed the test implemented in
Walling and reiterated in Tony & Susan Alamo, the Supreme Court has
decided no cases on point since this decision.
Although decisions subsequent to Walling have more narrowly
interpreted the meaning of "employee" under the Act, allowing
more individuals to volunteer, the test nevertheless remains far too
stringent and prevents many individuals from volunteering valuable
services, even at nonprofit organizations. Whenever an individual is
performing a business activity at a covered enterprise, the employer
must compensate the individual for services rendered, regardless of
her desire to receive no monetary compensation. 173
167 Id. at 302.
The Solicitor General states that in determining whether individuals have
truly volunteered their services, the Department of Labor considers a va-
riety of factors, including the receipt of any benefits from those for whom
the services are performed, whether the activity is less than full-time oc-
cupation, and whether the services are of the kind typically associated
with volunteer work. The Department has recognized as volunteer serv-
ices those of individuals who help to minister to the comfort of the sick,
elderly, indigent, infirm, or handicapped, and those who work with re-
tarded or disadvantaged youth.
Id. at 303 n.25.
168 877 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1989).
169 Id. at 1208.
170 Id. at 1209.
171 Id. at 1210.
172 Id.
173 See supra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
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IV
HYPOTHETICALS ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEM
Federal courts' and the DOL's interpretations of the FLSA have
ignored Congress's original intent to protect only the most un-
derpaid and overworked employees who are the targets of employer
coercion, and have instead applied the Act's mandatory minimum
wage and overtime provisions to all individuals who do not fall
squarely within the Act's exceptions. As a result, individuals volun-
teering to perform business activities at both nonprofit and for-
profit enterprises are prohibited from working without compensa-
tion, despite their desire not to be compensated. The following hy-
potheticals will help illustrate the problem with the current state of
the law.
Hypothetical #1
A nonprofit organization hires Patricia, an individual with a dis-
ability, as a part-time volunteer. In this capacity, Patricia is able to
learn office skills through data entry, word processing, filing, re-
search, writing, and other secretarial and clerical work. The non-
profit organization intends to train Patricia for ten hours per week
for one year. Patricia will acquire skills that she hopes will make her
more marketable in the future if she decides to obtain full-time, paid
employment. She does not expect compensation for her volunteer
work and does not need the money for her livelihood. Unfortu-
nately, the nonprofit organization does not have sufficient funds to
pay Patricia for her services. Therefore, the organization applies to
the DOL for a certificate entitling it to pay Patricia a subminimum
wage. Because Patricia's skills are at a level commensurate with the
minimum wage, the DOL denies the organization certification. The
nonprofit organization has no choice but to release Patricia from her
volunteer position.
Hypothetical #2
Paul, a computer programmer, recently received a lifesaving
kidney transplant through the Kidney Foundation and now wants to
aid individuals in similar circumstances. Paul, however, is unable to
make a monetary contribution to the Foundation because of his
large, outstanding medical bills. Therefore, he offers to install an
updated computer system and serve as a part-time office analyst for
the Foundation. Because of the depressed state of the economy and
employers' beliefs that his disability will hinder his job performance,
he is unable to find compensable, part-time work elsewhere. As a
result, he decides to volunteer his efforts during his recuperation
until he can seek full-time employment. The Kidney Foundation re-
gretfully advises Paul that, although he may make a monetary dona-
tion, the Department of Labor will prohibit him from donating his
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time in a productive capacity. Paul therefore remains idle through-
out his recovery.
Hypothetical #3
Judy recently graduated with a communications degree from a
reputable university and wants to pursue a career in broadcasting at
a television station. After circulating her resume widely, she is un-
able to obtain employment in this field. Therefore, she takes a sales
position at a local car dealership. She then offers to volunteer at a
television station so that she can acquire skills, make some connec-
tions, and have relevant experience to aid her in acquiring future
full-time employment in the television industry. The television sta-
tion is unable to fund a position for Judy and must decline her offer
because she is no longer a student and therefore does not fall under
the student exception to the Act. Judy continues to work at the car
dealership, where she receives no relevant work experience to fulfill
her career aspirations.
No current exemption to the FLSA allows the individuals in the
three hypotheticals to volunteer their services. First, an application
of the six "trainee" criteria to these situations compels the conclu-
sion that these individuals would be employees and not trainees. 174
The work to be performed is not typical of vocational school instruc-
tion. Although the individuals might not work at the same speed as
the organizations' full-time employees, the organizations would nev-
ertheless receive some benefit and productive output from the addi-
tional work. Second, the individuals would not serve as
independent contractors because their work would constitute an in-
tegral part of the employers' businesses and the employers would be
the providers of all material and equipment used. 175
Supreme Court decisions exploring this issue state that the em-
ployer must receive no "immediate advantage" from volunteer
work. 176 Since all three organizations would receive a high degree
of productive output from the volunteers, the federal courts and the
DOL would most likely deem these individuals "employees" subject
to the Act's mandatory minimum wage and overtime provisions. Af-
ter the Tony & Susan Alamo decision, the federal courts and the DOL
are even more likely to deem these individuals "employees" for pur-
poses of the FLSA because the Court, in that case, added a second
prong to its exclusive benefits test.177 Not only must the employer
receive no immediate advantage from the work performed, but the
work performed must not be a "business activity." Since the three
174 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 130-38, 152-67 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 152-67 and accompanying text.
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individuals would perform commercial business activities, the em-
ployers would be required to compensate these individuals for the
work. For the purpose of the statute, it is immaterial that these
workers consider themselves volunteers and do not expect or even
want monetary compensation.' 78
Nevertheless, the refusal to allow these individuals to volunteer
their services goes beyond the protection contemplated by Con-
gress in passing the Act. In recommending passage of the Act, the
Senate Committee professed its desire not to invade the rights of
employers and employees to fix the terms of their employment con-
tracts, if the parties are generally able to bargain over the terms of
the contract. 179 Both the Senate and the House stated that the
FLSA was drafted to protect only the most poorly paid and over-
worked workers.' 80 The DOL and the federal courts, however, have
continued to expand the Act far beyond its intended reach. As a
result, those individuals who are both competent to contract with
their prospective employers and not dependent on monetary com-
pensation for their livelihood are prevented from performing pro-
ductive work in a volunteer capacity and must forego opportunities
to receive valuable work experience, despite the complete absence
of employer coercion.
In Walling, the Supreme Court cited another aspect of Con-
gress' intent in passing the Act: "to increase opportunities for gain-
ful employment."' 8' 1 By subjecting these individuals to the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Act, neither the
Supreme Court nor the DOL is furthering this purpose of the
FLSA.' 8 2 The prospective volunteers believe that they are receiving
compensation for their services in the form of experience or the ful-
fillment of humanitarian objectives. Indeed, in all three situations,
the individuals are attempting to increase their chances of obtaining
future paid employment.
Unless Congress amends the FLSA, Patricia will not acquire of-
fice skills that would make her more marketable in the future. Simi-
larly, Paul will not work during his recovery and will probably
encounter difficulty in resuming his career after an extended ab-
sence from the computer industry. Judy will continue to work at the
car dealership, where she will receive no relevant experience and
will establish no contacts in the television industry. This lack of ex-
perience will most likely hinder their future marketability and, in
178 See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
181 330 U.S. at 151.
182 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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turn, decrease their prospects for realizing higher wages in the fu-
ture because of skills deficits. Indeed, none of the individuals is "in-
creas[ing] ... opportunities for gainful employment."18 3 There is,
however, a solution that will both enable these individuals to volun-
teer their services and safeguard against employer coercion.
V
A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
A. Determining the Solution
In her note entitled The Applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act
to Volunteer Workers at Nonprofit Organizations,184 Lisa M. Milani con-
siders how the Tony & Susan Alamo decision might dramatically affect
volunteers at nonprofit organizations. According to Milani, by
adopting the exclusive benefits test, the Supreme Court risks ad-
versely affecting the operations of religious and other nonprofit or-
ganizations. She fears that "courts may construe the result ... to
extend coverage to individuals who volunteer . . . and receive or
contemplate the receipt of wages only incidentally to the services
rendered." 85
Milani applies Tony & Susan Alamo to the situation of volunteers
at Goodwill, a nonprofit organization whose workers are mostly vol-
unteers. 186 She argues that extending the Court's decision to Good-
will volunteers "would increase the cost of Goodwill's telephone
solicitation project, and also lessen the income gained through sales
of donated items at Goodwill thrift shops.., thus... reduc[ing] the
amount of money that Goodwill could expend providing services to
handicapped persons."'187 This effect would then spread to other
charitable organizations, which would consequently have decreased
revenues to assist the sick and needy.' 88 Milani concludes that,
while Congress intended to prevent unfair competition and improve
labor conditions, it did not intend to force nonprofit organizations
to pay minimum wages to all of their workers. 189 She proposes that
Congress amend the FLSA to exempt all volunteer workers at chari-
table organizations. 90
183 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
184 Lisa M. Milani, The Applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Volunteer Workers at
Nonprofit Organizations, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223 (1986).
185 Id. at 235 (footnote omitted).
186 Id. at 237.
187 Id. at 238 (footnote omitted). Goodwill donates a portion of its resources to job
training and placement of individuals with handicaps. Id. at 234.
188 Id. at 238.
189 Id. at 242-43.
190 Id.
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Although Milani recognizes the need to address the potential
problems resulting from an extension of Tony & Susan Alamo to vol-
unteers at nonprofit organizations, her solution, while supporting
certain aspects of Congress' original intent, clearly ignores others.
In enacting the legislation, Congress did not intend to abridge most
workers' rights to contract for their own employment terms, and
wanted instead "to increase opportunities for gainful employ-
ment."191 Milani's proposed amendment would surely enable pro-
spective volunteers to negotiate with their employers over the terms
of their employment contracts, and would also allow individuals,
such as the volunteers at Goodwill, to increase their opportunities
for future gainful employment. Congress, however, articulated an-
other purpose in enacting the FLSA: to eliminate employer coer-
cion by assisting "the helpless victims of their own bargaining
weakness . . . obtain a minimum wage."' 192 The potential for em-
ployer coercion is present even at nonprofit organizations, where
poverty-stricken individuals might seek employment at subminimum
wages. If Congress were to adopt such a blanket exemption, an im-
portant aspect of Congress's original intent would be frustrated.
Furthermore, Milani's solution is underinclusive; the DOL should
allow for-profit organizations to hire volunteers as well. For-profit
corporations can provide valuable training experience that individu-
als could not receive at non-profit organizations. There is, indeed, a
way to protect volunteer workers against employer abuses at both
nonprofit and for-profit organizations without violating the FLSA's
original intent.
B. The Solution
Looking solely at the legislative intent behind the passage of
the FLSA, one can conclude that Congress did not intend the Act to
cover individuals voluntarily performing productive work. The Sen-
ate and House committee reports indicate that Congress did not
want the FLSA, in ordinary circumstances, to invade individuals'
rights to contract for their own employment terms. 193 According to
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the FLSA in Walling and in
Tony & Susan Alamo, Congress sought to prevent employers from us-
ing their bargaining power to force employees to work for less than
the minimum wage, and intended to apply the FLSA only to those
working in contemplation of compensation. 194 The Court further
stated that Congress never intended to prevent employers from pro-
191 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
192 See S. REP. No. 884, supra note 71, at 5.
193 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
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viding free services and training.195 Rather than developing a test
to determine the presence of employer coercion, the Court decided
to guard against such coercion by simply banning all individuals
from working for subminimum wages, unless the individuals work
"solely for their own pleasure or profit."' 19 6
Allowing organizations to accept volunteers who work in busi-
ness capacities will enable organizations to increase their productiv-
ity. Moreover, volunteers will gain experience that will bolster their
skills and make them more marketable. Nevertheless, Congress
must impose restraints on such volunteerism. Indeed, one must not
lose sight of one of Congress' original purposes behind passing this
anti-poverty device: to prevent employer coercion.' 97 But, where
employer coercion is clearly lacking and individuals are not depend-
ent on the employment for their livelihood, Congress should amend
the FLSA to allow individuals to volunteer their services. Such an
amendment will both increase productivity and decrease the skills
deficits of many individuals.
In formulating a solution that takes into account the original
Congressional goals, one must distinguish between for-profit and
nonprofit corporations. As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated in Isaacson, the nonprofit organization's corporate purpose,
unlike that of the for-profit corporation, is to benefit the public at
large.' 98 Because nonprofit organizations need less expensive ways
to maintain their labor-intensive social services, volunteer activity at
such organizations should not only be permitted, but encouraged.
Hence, the individual volunteer gains a benefit pursuant to her own
humanitarian objectives or career aspirations, while the public at
large receives greater beneficial services.199
Conversely, at for-profit corporations the public receives no di-
rect benefit from work performed by the volunteer, while employers
reap great benefits in the form of increased revenues. If the DOL
allows for-profit employers to seek volunteers, such employers
might coerce individuals into providing free services by suggesting
that volunteer service will enhance the prospect of obtaining a paid
position at the corporation at some later date. Corporations could
feign such a purpose and yet hire the volunteers purely to maximize
profits, with no intention of ever hiring the workers for paid posi-
tions. The public would receive no direct benefit from the corpora-
tion's efforts to maximize its profits. Nevertheless, if the DOL
195 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 69-75, 132 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 13-46 and accompanying text.
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continues to prohibit all individuals from volunteering in business
capacities at for-profit corporations, individuals will lose valuable
training and experience that they could not otherwise receive. 200
The DOL, however, could prevent this type of employer coer-
cion through restraints on advertising. Because non-profit organi-
zations need volunteers to maintain their labor-intensive services to
benefit the public as a whole, the DOL should allow them to adver-
tise for volunteers to maintain adequate levels of service. Because
for-profit corporations do not have a similar public-good motive,
the DOL should prohibit them from advertising for volunteer posi-
tions. This prohibition would ensure that the individual's wish to
volunteer springs from her desire to gain experience and not from
the employer's desire to maximize profits. Such restraints on adver-
tising would presumably be easy to monitor since advertising is a
public medium of communication.
Restraints on advertising, however, are insufficient to guard
against all employer coercion; the potential for employer coercion
will nonetheless exist at both for-profit and nonprofit corporations.
Therefore, additional safeguards are necessary. To determine
whether an organization is coercing an individual to volunteer her
services, one must assess whether the volunteer is deriving a benefit
from her work. As the Supreme Court noted in Tony & Susan Alamo,
payment under the FLSA need not be in the form of wages. 20 1 If the
DOL and the federal courts recognize experience as a form of pay-
ment, neither corporate form will receive purely gratuitous services
from its volunteers. One may argue that such intangible payments
are too difficult to quantify. However, the DOL and the federal
courts have already demonstrated a way to measure intangible bene-
fits in their exception for trainees.20 2
The current test used to determine whether an individual is an
employee or a trainee who is exempt from the FLSA's provisions is
as follows:
(1) the training, even though it includes actual operation of the
facilities of the employer, is similar to that which would be given
in a vocational school;
(2) the training is for the benefit of the trainees. .
(3) the trainees... do not displace regular employees, but work
under their close observation;
(4) the employer that provides the training derives no immediate
advantage from the activities of the trainees... ; and on occasion
his operation may actually be impeded;
200 See supra notes 27-46 and accompanying text.
201 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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(5) the trainees ...are not necessarily entitled to a job at the
conclusion of the training period; and
(6) the employer and the trainees ... understand that the trainees
... are not entitled to wages for the time spent in training.
20 3
The DOL carved out this exception for trainees in order to
"prevent curtailment of opportunities in employment. ' 20 4 Simi-
larly, by allowing individuals to volunteer to perform work in pro-
ductive capacities, the DOL will further the Act by promoting
opportunities in employment through training and experience. By
slightly altering the current rules applicable to the hiring of trainees,
the DOL can, indeed, insure that the volunteer receives compensa-
tion to the same extent as a qualifying trainee. The proposed test
should take the following form:
(1) the volunteer work is for the benefit of the volunteer;
(2) the volunteer does not displace regular employees, but works
under their close observation;
(3) the volunteer derives a substantial advantage from the work
performed;
(4) the volunteer is not necessarily entitled to ajob at the comple-
tion of his or her volunteer work; and
(5) the employer and the volunteer understand that the volun-
teers are not entitled to wages for the time spent volunteering.
This proposed test keeps the second and third prongs of the
trainee test in place. The work must benefit the volunteer, and the
volunteer must not displace a regular employee, but rather work
under her close observation.20 5 The former requirement will en-
sure that the individual is deriving a benefit, albeit a nonmonetary
one, from the work performed. The latter requirement will ensure
that the organization is not accepting the volunteer's work to avoid
paying the salary of a regular, paid employee. In order to meet this
latter prong, the organization should publish an employee hand-
book detailing precise job descriptions for its regular, paid employ-
ees and stating the number of employees who fill these positions.
The corporation should include a copy of this handbook, along with
a list of all paid employees and their positions in the organization, in
the records that it must keep pursuant to DOL requirements. 20 6
The prospective volunteer must not assume the responsibilities of a
position described on the list. This requirement will protect current
employees from having volunteers usurp their roles.
203 EMPLOYMENT RELATIoNs SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 4-5.
204 Minimum Wages and Overtime Pay, supra note 86, at 16.
205 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
206 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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The fifth and sixth prongs of the trainee test also remain un-
changed. A volunteer cannot expect the right to paid employment
upon completion of her training period, and both the volunteer and
the employer should be aware that no monetary compensation is
owed for the time spent volunteering. 20 7 If an employer promises a
volunteer that she might be entitled to a permanent position upon
completion of the volunteering period, the promise may induce the
individual to volunteer in the hopes of later obtaining paid employ-
ment. Therefore, it is necessary that both parties understand that a
volunteer position does not guarantee, or even make more likely, a
future paid position. Consequently, it would be highly unlikely for
an impoverished individual to be unduly influenced to work for free
if she does not expect a paid position upon completion of the volun-
teer work.
Despite the similarities, this proposed test differs from the
trainee test in two major ways. First, Congress should delete the
vocational school requirement of the trainee test because some vol-
unteer work constitutes office procedure that is not part of voca-
tional instruction. Second, Congress should change the fourth
prong. This portion of the trainee test states that the employer pro-
viding the training must derive no immediate advantage from the
work performed and "on occasion his operations may actually be
impeded. ' 20 8 This prong contains the "exclusive benefits" test of
Walling and Tony & Susan Alamo. 209 By performing productive work,
volunteers will necessarily provide the employer with a benefit and
thus fail the "exclusive benefits" test. Indeed, it is impossible to
perform actual, hands-on training in business activities without the
employer deriving at least some benefit from the work. Therefore,
at the very least, the DOL should modify the "exclusive benefits"
test articulated in Walling and Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation in favor
of the "principal benefits" test articulated in Isaacson and
McLaughlin.210
However, given the difficulties in determining whether the em-
ployer or the volunteer derives the principal benefit from the work
performed, an even better modification would be the DOL's adop-
tion of a "substantial benefits" test. Not only is the subjective "prin-
cipal benefits" test difficult to implement, but it can also achieve
contrary results in cases with identical facts. For example, if an indi-
vidual with a disability volunteers at a nonprofit organization and
performs office tasks, both the employer and the volunteer receive a
207 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
208 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 5.
209 See supra notes 130-38, 152-67 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 142-51, 168-74 and accompanying text.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
benefit. The organization receives the benefit of increased office
productivity, and the volunteer receives the benefit of training and
experience that might lead to future, gainful employment. One
court might deem the employer to be the principal beneficiary of the
work performed, while a second court, sensitive to the plight of
workers with disabilities, might view the volunteer as the principal
beneficiary.
If the DOL were to adopt a "substantial benefits test," the focus
of the analysis would shift to the individual wishing to volunteer. As
long as the prospective volunteer will derive a "substantial" benefit
in the form of training and experience, the DOL should permit her
to volunteer, regardless of the degree of advantage that the em-
ployer may gain from the work. In order to meet the "substantial
benefits" test, the volunteer must show how the experience will
prove relevant to her career aspirations and thus constitute "com-
pensation." The volunteer must also show, through a financial dis-
closure, that she does not need compensation for her livelihood. As
long as the volunteer receives a substantial benefit from the work
that she freely performs, the DOL should permit the individual to
volunteer.
The DOL, after an investigation, should certify corporations
meeting the five criteria as eligible to utilize volunteer services.
These qualifying corporations should be allowed to utilize such
services only until the individuals receive their compensation, or
"substantial benefits," in the form of training and experience. The
DOL already performs similar investigations when determining
whether to allow organizations to employ trainees, student learners,
and individuals with disabilities at subminimum wages. Accord-
ingly, investigation costs and efforts should not present major ad-
ministrative impediments to the adoption of this test.2 1 1 This test
should impose little or no additional burdens on the employer who
currently must maintain records regarding its employees and other
workers exempt from the Act.212
Most importantly, the imposition of this test will not frustrate,
but rather will further, the legislative intent behind the passage of
the FLSA. In passing the FLSA, Congress wished to ameliorate the
poor economic conditions that plagued the Depression era and to
prevent employers from wielding superior bargaining power over
weak, unaware employees. By forcing the FLSA on individuals wish-
ing to volunteer in business activities, Congress furthers neither ob-
jective. The current state of the law prevents many individuals, such
as workers with disabilities and recent college graduates, from gain-
211 See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
212 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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ing valuable training experience. This, in turn, causes such individ-
uals to have decreased earning potential because of skills deficits.
This situation, however, is unnecessary. The DOL can, indeed,
guard against employer coercion through this proposed test and
thereby increase, not decrease, opportunities for gainful
employment.
CONCLUSION
An examination of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Department of
Labor publications, and federal court decisions interpreting the
FLSA reveals a dramatic limitation on acceptable volunteer activi-
ties. Driven by a fear of employer coercion, federal courts and the
DOL refuse to allow individuals to volunteer to perform business
activities that benefit the employer, unless these services fall within a
very narrow category of exceptions. Rather than provide a way to
guard against employer coercion, the courts and the DOL have de-
cided simply to ban all such volunteer activity. Since employer coer-
cion can be controlled, Congress should amend the FLSA to allow
individuals to volunteer their services whenever no clear evidence of
employer coercion exists. Not only will such an amendment com-
port with the legislative intent behind the passage of the FLSA, but
it will also encourage individuals to pursue humanitarian objectives
and enhance the public good. Furthermore, the amendment will en-
able certain individuals to receive valuable training that may lead to
gainful employment.
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